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ABstrACt
This paper attempts to clarify the nature of law, specifically 
the distinction between individuals who implement laws 
within an existing social system and those who struggle to 
change the system. In particular, it challenges the possibility 
of emancipation through social transformation. This paper 
will suggest that the Indonesian concept of Pancasila – 
promoted by its former president Soekarno – fulfills this 
function of morality grounding the validity of laws. It 
represents the ethical life of the people uniting them into 
a nation. But it can be extended to international relations 
as well and serve as validating principles in implementing 
international laws in economic, social, and political 
co-operation. This paper will explore Pancasila in connection 
to the approaches of Habermas and Honneth. It will also 
contrast this approach with that of Huntington.  
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introduCtion
One of the leading online news outlets, Republika, presented 
a report on 30 September 2013 that claimed that Indonesia has 183 
disadvantaged regions, 143 of which are conflict-prone areas - many of 
them in Eastern Indonesia. According to the report, the roots of conflict are 
economic, socio-cultural, religious, and political. The reporter observed 
that there is a link between disadvantaged regions and conflict. Conflicts 
or natural disasters damage the economy and many infrastructure which 
sets back development. Preventing social conflict requires participation by 
both local people and international communities. Seminars and workshops 
need held to seek ways to improve coordination and collaboration between 
conflict-affected groups, non-governmental organizations, and decision-
makers of public administration at all levels.2  
We need to educate ourselves on how to deal with social conflicts 
such as understanding and accepting differences between conflicting 
parties. Pancasila can be used in dealing with such conflicts on the basis of 
its guiding principles as a moral grammar for attaining mutual recognition 
and resolving social conflicts. The aim of this paper is to examine how 
social conflicts can be resolved based on mutual respect and solidarity. By 
comparing the theory of the clash of civilizations of Samuel P. Huntington 
(1927-2008) and Soekarno’s vision on Pancasila as a universal principles 
of morality we can arrive at a particular grammar for the remaking of the 
world order after cold world war. Through the use of a phenomenological 
method, a moral grammar of mutual respect and solidarity can be expected 
to establish a new paradigm on how  global politics can be established 
to build a new world. It is the idea of “ethical life” that may be used to 
ground the validity of laws for sustaining integrity within the diversity 
of cultural identities and political ideologies.  Jürgen Habermas (1929-) 
whose theory of communicative action and Axel Honneth (1949-) whose 
theory of the struggle of recognition are useful theories for building a 
new grammar for social relations in modern societies especially when 
they need to solve social conflict.     
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moral Grammar
In general, the term grammar is the set of structural rules governing 
the composition of clauses, phrases, and words to make sentences that are 
understood and can be used in communication. The nature of language is 
to communicate and the function of communication should be to reach 
understanding. There is therefore a need for both linguistic grammar and 
communication skills in order to do exchange ideas and come to understand 
one another. This is all about communicative competence for an effective 
interaction especially in dealing with social conflict resolutions by 
conflicting parties themselves.  
But communicative competence is only the means by which an 
effective social interaction can lead to mutual understanding. The ultimate 
end of social interaction rests in the heart of man as a political animal 
he/she is seeking the well-being and not just an economic welfare. This 
is the importance of political philosophical accounts, from the time of 
Socrates, focusing on the good life of men how to live both as individual 
and political being in a political community. 
One of the collected dialogues is Crito in which Socrates shows 
that the truths of great men speak to us only so far as we have ears and souls 
to hear them. Genius hears the overtones, and the music of the spheres. 
Genius knows what Pythagoras meant when he said that philosophy is the 
highest music. Socrates reminds us that philosophy aids men in choosing 
the best life as within a political community. Socrates told Crito to do 
not mind to listen to the teachers of philosophy whether they are good 
or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try to examine her well and 
truly; and if she be evil, seek to turn away all men from her; but if she be 
what I believe she is, then follow her and serve her, and be good cheer.  
This means the structural components of the state is deduced from 
the idea of the good on which laws are established. Laws are therefore 
reflections of morality for the state, the officials, and the people to realize 
the ultimate end of life which is the well-being. This is what Socrates’s 
main concern in Crito when he asks his friend Crito not to disobey 
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the laws because it will destroy the laws and the whole state as well.3 
Retaliation is a violation to living political communities. Finally Socrates 
asked Crito not to retain all arguments against the law. It is repeated in 
Republic that good laws are only necessary means for the state, the people, 
and the officials to be guided to the end of life. To order a state rightly 
men’s souls must be raised to behold the universal light so that men can 
always be just, and only the just men can know what justice is.4 
In Politics, Aristotle has explained that the state is the highest form 
of community and aims at the highest good. The structural components 
of the state constitute villages, households, male and female, master and 
slave in seeking all the need of men. Therefore the ultimate end of the state 
is satisfying the good life of men. Political communities are founded on a 
natural impulse in order to secure a bare subsistence.5 Plato discussed ideal 
state on the principle of the good by which he would promote unity in the 
strictest sense. This, according to Aristotle, is wrong because it is against 
natural affection of men. The good citizen may not be a good man. The 
good citizen is one who does good service to his/her state while this state 
may be bad in principle. In a constitutional state the good citizen knows 
both how to rule and how to obey. The good man is one who is fitted to 
rule. But a citizen in a constitutional state learns to rule by obeying orders. 
Therefore citizenship in such a state is a moral training.6
Hobbes pointed out in Leviathan that when men are in the state 
of nature, fear and liberty are consistent. But when men are in the state 
of civility,  liberty is not a right of ordinary people because individual 
liberties are given to the sovereign. Therefore fear of the leviathan would 
civilize people by restraining their evil inclinations toward one other. To 
illustrate his argument, Hobbes used the analogy of a ship that would sink 
if the passengers did not throw their possessions overboard. If possessions 
were not thrown overboard, the ship would sink and possessions as well 
as life would be lost.7 Hobbes’ view of desirable government contrasts 
with that of Locke. Locke viewed society on a scale from subjugation to 
personal freedom and declared personal freedom to be the ideal. Locke 
stands firmly in social contract theory that there are inalienable rights to 
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be given to the state. The basic grammar of the rule of law is to guarantee 
personal freedom. There is therefore the state developed to accomplish 
personal liberties that men have in the previous stage of living in families 
and particular communities.  Social contract is no less than a rational 
construction to ground the existence of a political community from what 
is already experienced. 
Rousseau looks at the state as symphony where each part is 
sustained by all the other parts. But in this symphony a single melody 
should have primacy over all other musical parameters. The general will is 
this single melody that allows the state to come into existence. Comparing 
it with musical clarity also implies that the listener can choose what to 
hear.8
Kant’s understanding of the state was as a persona civitatis. 
For him the state in the hand of the sovereign has the will to command. 
The will of the state is above the will of citizens because it is the personification 
of the will of citizens. In connection to his categorical imperative, the 
expression of the will of the sovereign state corresponds to the goal of 
the will of citizens. A study of Michael Blome-Tillmann shows that 
Kant’s doctrine of state sovereignty is an ambiguous foundation for 
liberal internationalist theory because on the one hand, he suggests that 
any existing form of sovereignty is adequate to the goal of freedom. On 
the other, he claims that all existing sovereigns are compelled to undergo 
self-reform.9 Kant grounds his political project on a conviction that the 
public use of reason and open debate will gradually lead us away from 
an initial preoccupation with anarchy and coercion in creating the space 
for reflection and increased autonomy. Arendt is correct saying that Kant 
never truly wrote about political philosophy. This is the reason why in 
his Critique of Judgment one can see how Kant developed a grammar of 
political philosophy rather than a moral philosophy. His question is about 
politics and is reflective rather than practical. 
If thinking of morality as a purely private matter of the individual’s 
conscience seems too abstract, the Hegelian criticisms show that moral 
reflections are empty unless they take account of the social world in which 
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they can be realized in concrete actions. In reference to inclusive context 
of Sittlichkeit which is the ethical life of the people in which social action 
can be understood as expression of a moral will taking place in social, 
political, and historical context.10
As descendants of the Frankfurt School, Habermas and Honneth 
try to integrate Kant’s concept of freedom with Hegel’s phenomenological 
idea of the Sitlichkeit in order to shift from a grammar that is neither 
merely formalist reason nor merely embedded social action.  Habermas’ 
approach to social problems is similar to Durkheim’s sociological theory 
of solidarity.  For him, solidarity expresses a regularity in answering the 
question concerning how society is possible. This question is put in the 
context of modern and contemporary societies that seek solidarity neither 
simply as a form of altruistic action, nor as a derivation of the Catholic 
‘ethos of brotherliness’. Using linguistic analysis, Habermas considers 
solidarity as a frame of shared values and/or rules that keeps society 
together. The question about how society possibly can be analyzed from a 
set of shared values and rules institutionalized and available to everyone 
within the public space.11 This thesis relies on the ideas of mutual 
respect, solidarity, and generalized interests that coincides largely with 
Hegel’s idea of Sittlichkeit and Kant’s idea of freedom.  Solidarity is 
now considered the moral will of all concerned and it is now accepted 
as the inconditionnalité conditionnelle, unconditioned condition that all 
informed participants would freely accept. Thinking solidarity along this 
normative line is not inconsistent with the principle of the social order 
and social integration where values of a post-conventional identity can 
be expressed into modem laws. 
In an age of bitter “identity politics” and pseudo-claims to 
“inclusivity” social theorists felt compelled to go back to foundational 
premises, to start all over again and rebuild a model of society based on 
reason, shared values, and individual autonomy. Axel Honneth, a social 
philosopher and Hegelian scholar attempts to construct a model which 
draws on the early Hegel (of the Jena period). He claims that social theory 
starts with social conflict resolution. Aside from Nicolo Machiavelli 
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and Hobbes, social conflict resolution can be explained through Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit where the Spirit develops its social life by 
means of a series of negations. Especially through “the struggle for 
recognition.” Honneth explains that human societies evolve from simple 
to complex, from ascribed or status-based honor to achievement, from an 
undifferentiated whole to a division of labour, from indifference to the 
fate of others to a recognition of interdependence, from private interests 
to shared values, from particularistic norms to universal laws and human 
rights, from authority based on tradition to a devaluation of tradition 
itself. As a third generation philosopher of the Frankfurt School, Honneth 
shows that the end point of the struggle for recognition is modernization 
without materialism and without techne. In this struggle for recognition, 
the social forms are family, civil society and the state which correspond 
respectively to love (affective bonds), law and solidarity, while on another 
level: intuition, cognitive recognition and rational intellectual intuition. 
The struggle for recognition links them reciprocally towards the final 
achievement of a “moral grammar” that is reconstruction of modern 
societies based on love, rights, and solidarity in seeking social integration 
within cultural diversities.12
the Clash of Civilizations
Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations describes the 
remaking of a global politics after the cold war. Huntington claims that 
the clash of civilizations occurs when civilized modern societies are not 
governed by balancing the real conditions concerning dos and don’ts in 
both private and public domains.13 It is because the clash of civilizations 
is potentially rooted in the way we look at the world from the point of 
differences. 
Huntington has provided us with the three maps about the world 
divisions in terms of differences. First is the division of the world in 
1920s between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’. Second is the division of the 
world in 1960s by the cold world war into the Free World, the Communist 
40   Prajñā Vihāra
Bloc, and the Unaligned Nations. Third is the division of the world of 
civilizations in 1990s into Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, 
Chinese, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese.14  
Huntington contends that global politics has become multipolar 
and multicivilizational after the collapse of communist world in 1980s 
and that the distinctions among peoples are no ideological, political, or 
economic but cultural. Huntington acknowledges the condition of the clash 
of civilizations as something serious. The recognition of this condition 
may actually help us to question: “Who we are? Where are we going? and 
What will we become?” Of course the question is answered by reference 
to things that mean most to us such as what religion, language, history, 
values, customs, and institutions do we have? 
People use politics not just to advance their interest but also to 
define their identity. Many conflicts are based on a false definition about 
our identity that is made only when we know who we are not and often 
only when we know whom we are against.15 This is because the most 
important groupings are no longer ideology but cultural preferences. 
It follows that the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts are 
conflicts between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. What 
underlies Huntington theory is therefore a particular grammar for the 
remaking of world order by balancing multipolar and multicivilizational 
world by which the shift to a new global politics after the post cold world 
war is made possible.  
Francis Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history places Western 
liberal democracy as the end of seeking commonalities of civilizations 
in dealing with social conflicts. But Huntington makes sure that the 
main concern of geopolitics is to safeguard peace and international order 
based on commonalities of civilizations that are still in the making. The 
question is how do we benefit out of different civilizations? How do we 
prevent war? What foundation can we make to safeguard world peace and 
international order? What kind of morality can be developed to include 
different worldviews in different cultures? 
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Cultures are relative while morality is absolute. Cultures prescribe 
institutions and behavior patterns to guide human actions which are 
right in any society. But morality refers to truth and justice in any given 
culture. It might be said that human society is universal because it is 
human. Likewise human society is also particular because it is a society. 
As at times we march with others, at times we march alone, and yet a 
thin minimal morality does derive from the common human condition; a 
universal dispositions which is present in all cultures. This is the pragmatic 
ethical concern which demands a search for what is common to most 
civilizations, instead of promoting the supposedly universal features of one 
civilization. And so the constructive course in a multicivilizational world 
is to renounce universalism, accept diversity, and seek commonalities.16
pancasila
Before Huntington’s provocative analysis about the new force in 
global politics, Indonesia’s President Soekarno has delivered a speech 
before the world delegations, in the United Nations 15th General Assembly 
on September 30, 1960. It represented a revolutionary understanding of 
international affairs. Soekarno’s speech was a plea to make peace and 
justice the UN’s main task. For Soekarno, the UN General Assembly is 
only the means by which every independent country can be encouraged 
by this world organization to achieve its full glory. 
Soekarno was ahead of Huntington in seeing the problem of 
international order before and during the cold world war. He believed 
that this order was politically wrong and culturally lacking in respect. 
His speech in the UN about the need “to build the world anew” was his 
attempt to share with the UN a particular grammar on how to make the 
UN work for international cooperation in seeking the well being of its 
members. The speech of Soekarno was inspired by Indonesia’s state 
philosophy – Pancasila – which pointed to mutual respect and solidarity 
among independent countries joining the UN. The first manifestation 
of Pancasila for the international cooperation was the Dasasila (ten 
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principles) formulated as the plea among Asian and African countries 
in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 to 24 April, 1955. The basic theme in 
Pancasila was reflected in Dasasila Bandung to ground the new politics 
of coexistence among Asian and African countries and could possibly be 
extended to include all independent countries in the UN. 
Pancasila consists of two old Javanese-Sanskrit words Panca 
and Sila. Panca means five and Sila means principle. The five principles 
are (1) belief in the one and only God, (2) just and civilized humanity, 
(3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by the inner wisdom in 
the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst representatives, and 
(5) social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.17  Development of these 
basic values in Dasasila according to Soekarno can be extended to the 
UN formulations of universal principles as the particular moral grammar 
in seeking peace and justice for a new world. The UN General Assembly 
is tasked to strengthen the very essence of being a nation to its members 
whose end is to realize the well-being of the people. There is therefore 
the need for a particular grammar in the renewal of an international order.
Huntington’s claim that culture to be made the core of seeking 
moral grammar is less comprehensive than Soekarno’s claim about 
Pancasila which is beyond cultural consciousness. In Pancasila, the 
task of remaking international relationships involves ideology, culture, 
religion, politics, economics, and fellowship. Soekarno’s concepts of 
Pancasila reflect back upon indigeneous peasant concepts of gotong royong 
literally meant the collective bearing of burdens and figuratively meant 
the piety of all for the interests of all. It is morally universal and culturally 
rooted in the everyday life-world of the people. It is beyond pragmatic 
consideration of ideological and cultural differences. The concern of 
Pancasila is all embracing universal values. It is about the ethical life that 
validates the rules of law in any given independent nation state.18 Pancasila 
serves to ground international order in peace and justice. It is similar to 
Max Scheler claims for social interactions to be based on an order of love 
(Ordo Amoris). It is because love is the maximum of justice and justice 
is the minimum of love. For social relations to last in any given society 
must be based on the universal order of mutual respect. 
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The first Principle (Sila I) is “belief in the one and only God”. 
It suggests that the role of religion is moral power and not political power. 
As a result, religion is not the opposition to the state. The state protects 
and guarantees the freedom of worship.  
Second Principle (Sila II) is “just and civilized humanity” which 
means universal values of humanity must be protected by the law for 
all its citizens, such as protection of physical security, family, ethnicity, 
property, and profession.
Third Principle (Sila III) is “the unity of Indonesia”. It means 
political nationalism and not an ethnic nationalism. Political nationalism 
is against sectarianism, primordialism, and discrimination. 
Fourth Principle (Sila IV) is “democracy guided by the 
inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation amongst 
representatives” which means democracy as the political system based 
on a liberal political culture.
 Fifth Principle (Sila V) is “social justice for all of the people of 
Indonesia”. It means solidarity and political decision-making must respect 
those who are the least advantaged.
Through Pancasila, Soekarno shows that there is a synthesis in the 
struggle for recognition because Pancasila achieves its aims through a 
communicative process involving structural components of the life-world. 
Therefore Pancasila can be used to serve as social norms in establishing 
social interactions and seeking social conflict resolutions.  It is conceived 
as a communicative imperative that respects diverse cultural identities. 
It is formulated on the basis of the better argument and therefore universally 
considered valid for all affected in their capacity as participants. 
Unlike Huntington, Soekarno inclusively allowed whatsoever 
differences to be made part of setting the agreement. Culture, politics, 
and economy are matters in competing for the reasonable foundations for 
all affected to preserve differences through mutual respect and solidarity. 
The end of the cold world war is not the end of competing ideologies 
because what Huntington named cultural identities is basically expression 
of ideologies. What Soekarno experienced before the independence of 
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the Republic of Indonesia was political ideologies such as liberalism 
versus communism, capitalism versus socialism, and free world versus 
colonized world. During the end of cold world war Soekarno feared new 
emerging forces of ideological dominations through neo-colonialism and 
neo-imperialism. Huntington’s division of the 1920s’ world map still 
remains: there is the free world and the rest.  The fact that cold world 
war is over does not change the situation of the 1960s, rather there are 
new forms of ideological competition that result from what Soekarno 
called NECOLIM (neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism). The fear of the 
clash of civilizations cannot be handled only by means of awareness of 
cultural identities. Since cultural values are relative, we need to form solid 
foundations in morality as the grammar of our struggle for recognition. 
The formulation of such grammar can be found in Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action in which Pancasila reflects the basic idea that moral 
recognition validates enacted laws. The Latin well-known proverb says 
Quid leges sine moribus which means laws without character worthless. 
This trajectory to the Young Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit come to terms 
with Honneth’s Anerkennung as the result of the struggle for recognition 
on which enacted laws can only attain validations for their being enforced 
if and only if they reflect morality of the people. This is for Habermas 
the Sollgeltung Prinzip of the validity of laws in modern societies. These 
are rules that command validity in speaking and acting by which social 
conflict resolutions are rationally accepted and procedurally well-arranged. 
Pancasila is the recognition that we must meet cultural diversities 
half way. Therefore it can be used as a moral grammar in seeking the 
better argument for all affected in their capacity to make decisions which 
benefit them equally. Pancasila is both the (U)niversal and the (D)iscourse 
principles in reference to Habermas’s theory of communicative action. 
As far as the five principles of Pancasila are concerned, Pancasila can be 
understood as the (U)niversal concept of morality while such principles 
open to further (D)iscourse within diverse cultural identities in modern 
societies. Using Habermas’s distinction between the (U) and the (D) 
principles, Pancasila fulfills the following conditions:19 
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(U) All affected can accept the consequences, and the side 
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have 
for the satisfaction of everyone (these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for 
regulation). 
Universal (U) principle is distinguished from discourse (D) 
principle which stipulates the basic idea of moral theory 
(theoretical discourse) but does not form part of a logic of 
argumentation (practical discourse).
(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet or 
could meet with the approval of all affected in their capac-
ity as participants in a practical discourse.
The principle (D) is the assertion that the philosopher as a moral 
theorist ultimately seeks to justify, and already presupposes principle (U). 
From here one can see that Habermas’s discourse ethics deals with a rule of 
argumentation rather than testing normative claims. The aim is to redeem 
normative claims into validity claims through argumentations. Habermas 
emphasizes that only in the concrete life-world laws are legitimized by 
an argumentation that is free from any compulsion whether internal or 
external of a practical discourse. This means that laws are legitimate only 
if the following presuppositions are fulfilled. 
(1)  Every subject with the competence to speak and act is 
allowed to take part  in discourse.
(2)  a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
 b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever 
into discourse.
 c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and 
needs.
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(3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, 
from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).20 
Using Habermas’s analysis of Kohlberg’s theory of moral 
developmentto relate stages of moral consciousness with models of 
democracy one can see that Pancasila is already in the sixth stage of moral 
grammar for grounding the validity of laws.
TABLE 1: TYPES OF LAWS AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY
Kohlberg’s 
stages of moral development
Relationship 
between morality 
and law
Habermas’s
types of legal 
paradigms
Pre- 
conventional 
Level A
Stage 1
Right: punishment 
and obedience
Stage 2
Right: instrumental-
purposive exchange
Magical Ethics 1. Tribal Societies
• Revealed doctrines
• Sacred traditions
Conventional Level B
Stage 3
Right: mutual inter-
personal relation and 
exchange
Stage 4
Right: social system 
and conscience main-
tenance
Tradition 2. Traditional Societies
• Customs
• Ethical codes based 
on tradition
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Kohlberg’s 
stages of moral development
Relationship 
between morality 
and law
Habermas’s
types of legal 
paradigms
Post-
conventional
Level C
Stage 5
Right: social contract 
and utilitarianism
Stage 6
Right: universal ethical 
principles
Universal 
Principles
• Ethical/ 
political  
and moral 
discourses
• Utilitarian 
and pragmatic 
discourses
• Procedural 
discourse
3. Modern Pluralistic 
Societies
• Natural laws
• Modern natural 
laws: system of 
rights
a. Classic Liberalism
b. Civic  
Republicanism
• Modern Law:  
system of actions
a. Legal Positivism
b. Legal Realism
• Reflective law: 
a. Universalized laws 
based on systems  of 
actions and rights 
Soekarno believes that Pancasila involves universal ethical principles 
that come to existence through a procedural discourse from May 29 to June 
1, 1945 held by BPUPKI (abbreviation of Indonesian to Badan Penyelidik 
Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekataan Indonesia which means The Committee 
for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence). On August 18, 1945, 
the day after the Proclamation of Indonesia’s Independence, Pancasila 
was finally established as the state philosophy by PPKI (abbreviation of 
Indonesian to Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia which means The 
Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence).21 Pancasila can 
be proposed as a model of the struggle for a moral grammar that can be 
discovered by modern societies in dealing with social conflicts and 
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resolutions if and only if they place mutual respect and solidarity on the 
highest priority.
Conclusion
Huntington’s approach to social conflict in modern societies 
through the clash of civilizations does not reflect phenomenological 
attitudes in the life-world since social conflicts are myriad of reasons. 
Culture is one of them. Fukuyama’s theory of the end of history seems 
to simplify the complexity of social systems into a liberal democratic 
system and therefore ignoring variety of cultural systems. As a shift in 
geopolitical paradigm, both Huntington and Fukuyama believe global 
politics must be based on a universal reason whether it is a universal 
culture or democracy. 
Soekarno’s concept of Pancasila involves the idea that the struggle for 
recognition requires communicative action to preserve cultural identities 
while establishing laws on universally validating principles of morality. 
As Habermas’s theory of communicative action and Honneth’s theory 
of the struggle for recognition are concerned, Pancasila manifests the 
dialectic process in generalizing different cultural worldviews involving 
economy, culture, and politics and therefore Pancasila is compatible 
with the search for a moral grammar, through which the dreams of a new 
world can be built.
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